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Applications of the International Space Station Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model 
Recently the International Space Station (ISS) has incorporated more Probabilistic Risk Assessments 
(PRAs) in the decision making process for significant issues.  Future PRAs will have major impact to ISS 
and future spacecraft development and operations.  These PRAs will have their foundation in the 
current complete ISS PRA model and the current PRA trade studies that are being analyzed as requested 
by ISS Program stakeholders.  ISS PRAs have recently helped in the decision making process for 
determining reliability requirements for future NASA spacecraft and commercial spacecraft, making 
crew rescue decisions, as well as making operational requirements for ISS orbital orientation, planning 
Extravehicular activities (EVAs) and robotic operations.  This paper will describe some applications of the 
ISS PRA model and how they impacted the final decision.  This paper will discuss future analysis topics 
such as life extension, requirements of new commercial vehicles visiting ISS. 
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ABSTRACT 
The International Space Station (ISS) program is 
continuing to expand the use of Probabilistic Risk 
Assessments (PRAs). The use of PRAs in the ISS 
decision making process has proven very successful 
over the past 8 years.  PRAs are used in the decision 
making process to address significant operational and 
design issues as well as to identify, communicate, and 
mitigate risks. Future PRAs are expected to have major 
impacts on not only the ISS, but also future NASA 
programs and projects.  Many of these PRAs will have 
their foundation in the current ISS PRA model and in 
PRA trade studies that are being developed for the ISS 
Program.  ISS PRAs have supported: 
- Development of reliability requirements for future 
NASA and commercial spacecraft, 
- Determination of inherent risk for visiting vehicles, 
- Evaluation of potential crew rescue scenarios, 
- Operational requirements and alternatives, 
- Planning of Extravehicular activities (EVAs) and, 
- Evaluation of robotics operations.   
This paper will describe some applications of the ISS 
PRA model and how they impacted the final decisions 
that were made.   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The ISS has been continuously manned for almost 
eleven years, longer than any other space station before. 
Now that its assembly has been completed, it is also the 
largest object to ever be built and operated in Earth 
orbit.  Fifteen nations have been involved with its 
design, construction, and onboard research activities.  
 
 
Figure 1, ISS Assembly Completed in Earth Orbit 
Unlike the representations of manned spacecraft in 
science fiction, the ISS is an extremely complex vehicle 
that requires constant vigilance, attention to detail, and 
diligent evaluation of risk in order to preserve its 
mission and provide the safest possible environment for 
its crew. 
 
In addition to various methods for identifying and 
qualifying the many and varied risks associated with 
day-to-day operation of the ISS, PRA provides a 
quantitative means of risk analysis to support program 
level discussions. An understanding of risk and its 
implications can be of significant value as decisions are 
made for a large number of issues related to the design 
and operation of the ISS. 
 
2. A PRIMER FOR PRA 
First, it is useful to understand what a risk is. A Risk is 
any future event with a negative consequence that has 
some probability of occurring. It is a combination of the 
likelihood of occurrence and the severity of the 
consequence. It usually represents an issue whose 
resolution is unlikely without focused management 
effort. An ISS Program risk poses a threat to the crew 
or vehicle safety, program cost, schedule, or major 
mission objective.  
 
Types of risk include cost, schedule, and technical risk. 
Technical risks may impact mission success, operational 
performance, and/or safety. When assessing risk, 
questions such as what can go wrong, how likely is it, 
and what is the consequence if the risk is realized, are 
evaluated. 
 
PRAs, as applied in the ISS Program, specifically 
address technical risk and attempt to quantify the 
likelihood of a risk or answer the question “how likely 
is it.”   
 
Given thousands of space stations operating for dozens 
of years, common statistics could be used to determine 
reasonably accurate predictions for failure.  However 
we have only one space station and it has had minimal 
experience and no catastrophic failures.  Therefore there 
will rarely be any statistically significant data available. 
PRAs can provide a quantitative measure of risk for rare 
events.  
  
The ISS PRA model provides probabilities for a select 
number of critical end states. The end states of concern 
are defined by the ISS Program or the organization 
requesting the analysis. A set of scenarios representing a 
sequence of failures and their frequencies were 
developed. Logical analysis was then applied to 
calculate the probability of occurrence for each 
scenario. Initiating events are modelled with other 
conditional events that eventually terminate with the 
realization of an end state via the given scenario. In the 
ISS PRA model, failures propagate through fault tress 
up to event trees which represent a scenario or event 
sequence.   
 
To create a PRA model, a detailed review of systems, 
components, hazard reports, and technical documents is 
performed. Scenarios in the form of event sequence 
diagrams and event trees are developed to be 
representative of systems functionality and ISS flight 
operations. The end states provide a quantitative value 
for the probability of failure including the uncertainty 
associated with that value. Specific failures that 
contribute to the end states are also important to 
understand, since it allows decision makers to  not only 
mitigate the risk, but also to effectively evaluate 
alternatives. 
 
 
Figure 2, PRA Process 
 
3. UTILIZATION OF ISS PRA 
The objectives of PRA are to: 
- Identify & evaluate risks to program/project goals 
and communicate them to management, 
- Support risk informed decision making with 
quantifiable data, and 
- Synchronize with other program/project process 
and activities in engineering, S&MA, Operations. 
 
The products provided from PRA analyses are risk 
models; probability distribution functions for end states, 
events, and accident scenarios; and operational trades 
and sensitivity analyses.  
 
There are generally two types of analyses that are 
performed using PRA. The first utilizes the complete 
ISS PRA model to evaluate end states and their 
contributors. Different time periods, selected scenarios, 
and a limited number of “what if” scenarios can be 
performed with this model. 
 
The second is the focused PRA analysis. This often 
utilizes a part of the ISS PRA model and adds additional 
detail or modifies a scenario. Unique models are also 
developed for these analyses when warranted. 
 
4. THE ISS PRA MODEL 
The ISS PRA model is highly detailed and complex. 
NASA requirements documents mandate its 
development, but do not specifically prescribe the extent 
of its use. In the ISS program, PRA has gained 
increased acceptance since the common use of it began 
in 2000. 
 
 
Figure 3, PRA Requests are Increasing 
 
Effective communication, quick turnaround times, and 
the demonstrated applicability of PRA have contributed 
to its increased use and value to the program. The ISS 
PRA model and focused PRA studies are now used to 
provide additional information to stakeholders 
representing nearly every aspect of the program.  
 
4.1. ISS PRA End States 
The ISS PRA model focuses on providing a quantitative 
probability, including uncertainty bounds, for reaching 
three critical end states - Evacuation (EVAC), Loss of 
Crew (LOC), and Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV). 
EVAC scenarios are those that are not immediately 
catastrophic but pose a threat to the crew, and would 
result in crew evacuation. The LOC end state includes 
scenarios that result in the death of one or more 
crewmembers.  It is restricted to those cases where 
death is immediate or evacuation is not possible. 
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 LOCV includes scenarios that result in the immediate 
loss of the ISS and crew.  The crew would have 
insufficient time to take corrective action or evacuate. 
 
 
Figure 4, End State Relationships 
 
The EVAC and LOC end states include all scenarios 
where one or more crew members are affected. This is 
important to communicate since one might initially 
believe that the EVAC end state means that the ISS is 
left with zero crew aboard. There are scenarios when an 
evacuation of three crew members occurs, but the other 
three crew members remain aboard. 
 
4.2.  PRA Model Scope 
The PRA model for the ISS reflects the current 
configuration of the vehicle currently in orbit. Modules, 
systems, propulsive maneuvers, robotics and Extra-
Vehicular Activities (EVA) are modelled. 
Phenomenological events such as fire and Micro-
Meteoroid and Orbital Debris (MM-OD) are also 
analyzed. Results are provided for medical scenarios via 
an independent Integrated Medical Model (IMM) 
developed by experts in the medical field. The results of 
the IMM are incorporated into the ISS PRA so that 
those risks can be assessed with other PRA risks as 
modelled.  
 
 
Figure 5, ISS PRA Model Scope 
Repair events, uncertainty, and, where applicable, 
human reliability are also accounted for.   
 
There are some things that are not modelled such as 
heroic actions. There is no reliable way to predict what 
actions might be taken that are outside of approved and 
trained flight rules and procedures. Software reliability 
had previously not been accounted for in the PRA 
model, but an effort is currently underway to provide a 
methodology to represent the risk associated with 
software. 
 
Results are provided to program stakeholders in the 
form of description, scope, assumptions or initial 
conditions, numerical results with uncertainty, 
contributors, and written analysis. The analysis provides 
context and explanation of the results within the given 
set of assumptions. This will become more evident in 
the following section as specific studies are discussed.  
 
5. SPECIFIC PRA STUDIES 
Focussed PRA studies developed for specific scenarios 
comprise the majority of PRA work that is completed 
for the ISS program each year. Many of these studies 
begin with the ISS PRA model and are then customized 
with additional detail and analysis. There are also a 
large number that are developed independently. Many 
scenarios that are requested for analysis begin outside of 
the ISS PRA model scope. When a study provides 
additional information or reveals improvement 
opportunities for the ISS PRA model, it is incorporated 
in the next scheduled model update. 
 
These studies provide an additional “data point” that, 
when evaluated with other information, contribute to 
decisions made for daily and future operations of the 
ISS.  The following sections give specific examples of 
how the PRA methodology is employed in the ISS 
Program.   
 
 5.1. Mobile Transporter Trailing Umbilical System 
Risk from MM-OD Impacts 
The Mobile Transporter (MT) is part of the Mobile 
Servicing System (MSS) on the ISS. It moves, or 
transports, the robotic arm, Canadarm 2. It runs along a 
rail on the outside of the ISS and was used extensively 
during ISS construction. It is still used for repairs and 
during some visiting vehicle operations. 
 
The rail that the MT moves on allows it to transverse 
the entire length of the station. Along the length of the 
rail there are designated stopping points called work 
stations. The MT is powered by a Trailing Umbilical 
System (TUS) cable that is attached by a reel. As the 
MT moves between work stations the TUS cable is 
pulled out from the reel or retracted back in. When 
positioned at work station #4, the TUS cable is almost 
fully retracted and protected from MM-OD damage by 
the TUS reel housing.  
 
Since the MT is an important operational asset, it is 
important to ensure its continued function by mitigating 
risk factors to the largest extent practical. A common 
practice was to minimize translations of the MT to 
preserve its operating life. After each operation the MT 
was left at its last worksite in lieu of the adding the 
additional operating time to return it to another 
worksite.  
 
Figure 6, Mobile Transporter with Canadarm-2 and 
SPDM 
 
The program concerns were as follows: 
− If the MT is left parked for long periods of time at 
worksites other than worksite 4 at the center of the 
S0 truss, the TUS reel cables will be exposed to risk 
of MM-OD penetration over long periods of time 
− Additional MT movement to park it at worksite #4 
may result in decreased MM-OD risk to the TUS 
cables. 
− Additional MT movement to park it at worksite #4 
may result in increased risk of MT failure due to 
the increased operating time. 
The PRA team was asked to quantify the probability of 
failure to compare these scenarios. The results of the 
analysis demonstrated close to two orders of magnitude 
difference in risk. It showed that damage to the MT was 
more likely to be from an MM-OD strike than from a 
hardware failure.  
 
 
Figure 7, MT Risk Comparison 
 
Using these results with other information, the program 
changed the practice of leaving the MT at its last 
worksite location. The MT is now returned to worksite 
#4 after each operation. 
 
5.2. Drag-thru Risk for Temporary Crew Quarters 
In 2009 a temporary crew quarters (CQ) was scheduled 
to be placed in the Japanese Experimental Module 
(JEM). Since this was to be a temporary location, a 
drag-thru cable was proposed that would provide 
caution and warning capability. The drag-thru in this 
case is a signal cable that is placed through the hatch 
way into the JEM. MM-OD penetrations represent a 
depression risk for the ISS and can be mitigated by 
closing hatches to isolate modules. A drag-thru would 
need to be removed in the event that the JEM hatch 
would need to be closed in an emergency. 
 
The caution and warning capability in a CQ is of 
primary concern since it will alert the crew member if 
airflow is lost. A loss of air flow would allow a build up 
of carbon dioxide that would displace the amount 
oxygen for the crew member to breath. If sleeping, the 
crew member may notice this condition. Any one of two 
fans on the CQ would prevent this from occurring. 
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Figure 8, Crew Quarters 
 
A PRA study was performed to compare the probability 
of losing airflow in the CQ to the risk of need to close 
the hatch in an emergency such fire or depress. 
 
 
Figure 9, Drag-thru risk for JEM Temporary CQ 
 
The study demonstrated that over a 6 month period (the 
average time for a crew increment) not having a caution 
and warning alarm capability in the CQ posed a greater 
risk. The probability of an emergency that require the 
JEM hatch to be closed was less.  
 
The drag-thru was allowed for this temporary condition 
until the CQ was moved to its permanent location.  
 
5.3. HTV Control Panel Failure Comparison to 
Portable Computer System with Backup 
The use of drag-thru cables for power and data is a 
concern for the program. Drag-thrus run through 
hatches between modules and must be removed in the 
event of an emergency that requires the hatch to be 
closed. When an operation dictates the use of a drag-
thru, each case must be evaluated independently and the 
risk assessed in order to keep their number to a 
minimum. 
 
The H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV) is a resupply vehicle 
designed by the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency 
(JAXA). Once it autonomously approaches the ISS, the 
Canadarm-2 is used to “grapple” the vehicle so that it 
can be manually berthed to ISS. There is a critical time 
period during this operation where the ISS crew must 
watch for problems and respond to them quickly. The 
crew response to a failure is to issue an abort command 
to the HTV causing it to move away from the ISS. 
 
 
Figure 10, H-II Transfer Vehicle 
 
When warranted, the abort command is sent via an HTV 
Control Panel (HCP). The HCP is stored in the JEM, but 
when in use, it is moved to the Cupola module.  
 
 
Figure 11, HTV Control Panel (HCP) 
 
The HCP must be connected to a panel in the JEM. This 
is accomplished using a drag-thru that must traverse 
through several modules before reaching the Cupola. 
An alternative to the HCP exists that allows portable 
computer systems (PCS), much like a laptop computer, 
with special software to be used. Unlike the HCP, 
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 however, PCSs are not specifically designed for the 
purpose of HTV rendezvous and were not subject to the 
same rigor for design and manufacture. The PCSs do 
not require a drag-thru. 
 
A PRA was requested to quantitatively show the risk 
comparison between using the HCP and a PCS with a 
second PCS as a backup. 
 
In this case the HCP was shown to be more reliable, 
however, there is only a small window of time when 
failure to send an abort command would be critical. 
When the probability of a required abort is coupled with 
the hardware failure probabilities of the HCP and PCSs, 
the overall probability for failure during an HTV 
rendezvous is very small for both scenarios. This led to 
a decision to use the PCSs for future missions after 
some additional analysis of the PCS software and 
command delay times. 
 
5.4. Risk of Shock During Extravehicular Activity 
(EVA) 
The ISS operates in an electrically conductive plasma 
environment. Both negative and positive potentials 
exist, but negative potentials are mitigated by plasma 
contactor units (PCU) that provide for ISS ground to 
plasma.  
 
 
Figure 12, Magnetically Induced Voltages on the ISS 
 
 
Positive charging is caused by magnetic induction as 
ISS passes through Earth’s magnetic field lines at higher 
latitudes. The hazard must be mitigated when the EVA 
crew member will be working at the outside extremes of 
the ISS past the Solar Array Alpha Joints (SARJ). In 
these conditions the EVA crew is exposed to a shock 
hazard if a path through the crewman’s body exists 
between the positively-charged ISS structure and 
negatively-charged plasma.  
 
In order for this to occur, several events must occur 
simultaneously: ISS structure must be at a positive 
potential. A conductive part of the Extravehicular 
Mobility Unit (EMU) must contact a conductive part of 
the ISS.  The crewman must be touching the inside of 
that conductive EMU part with either bare skin or by 
compressing a moist Liquid Cooling and Ventilation 
Garment (LCVG) against it. At the same time, the 
crewman must be touching the inside of either the Waist 
Bearing (WB) or the Body Seal Closure (BSC) while 
that part of the EMU is in contact with plasma.  
 
 
Figure 13, Location of Potentially Exposed Surfaces on 
EMU 
 
In order to understand the shock risk to the crew 
member, a PRA was performed using inputs from a 
team of experts from operations, safety, engineering, 
space medicine, environments and the EMU 
manufacturer. The analysis was performed for a 6.5 
hour period during which the crew member would be 
exposed to the hazard.  
 
For the purpose of this PRA, the model did not assess 
the severity of the shock, only the probability of its 
occurrence. These results were compared to the risk of a 
nominal EVA for perspective. 
 
 
  
Figure 14, Nominal EVA Risk vs. Additional Positive 
Potential Shock Risk 
 
This study supported a Non-conformance Report 
required to assess and approve the additional risk from 
potential shock hazards during a specific EVA. The 
PRA assisted in the identification of high likelihood 
areas on the EMU for a current path to the crew 
member. This information was then used to mitigate the 
high risk paths to make the EVA safer for the crew 
member. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
PRA is being used more and more frequently as the ISS 
Program evolves.  PRA is being used to support 
decisions with a wider range of risk scenarios and 
operational decisions in the ISS Program.  The use of 
PRA has proven to be very valuable in the decision 
making process. The use of PRA has increased 
drastically since 2008. Effective means of 
communication with management and a willingness to 
work with a every Program organization has been key in 
fostering this trend.  
 
Though it is not practical or recommended to utilize the 
results of a PRA alone, it has proven to be a valuable 
asset for a large number of design and operational 
decisions. Costs, schedule, experience, engineering 
judgement are still valuable and key factors in decision 
making.  PRA has, and will continue, to provide logical 
analyses of risk that help ensure the safety and longevity 
of the only human space platform in existence today. 
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